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Prior research in economics and psychology has shown that process can matter in determining 
outcomes in many social situations. In particular, the opportunity to express one’s opinion—
voice—has been found to be highly influential.  However, little is known about the channels 
through which voice may operate.  In this paper, we develop a simple economic model of voice 
to explore these channels.  We show that individuals value voice for: 1) its effect on outcomes, 2) 
its inherent value, or 3) its role in signalling one’s social standing. Through the introduction of a 
hypothetical round in the standard ultimatum game, we were able to test the channels of voice 
directly by observing recipients’ responses to offers which are lower than what they asked for. 
Our experimental results suggest that voice works primarily through its inherent value which 
appears to exceed its contribution to the perception of procedural fairness. Further, unlike voice 











   1.  Introduction 
   
Deep seated in standard economic theory, utilitarian consequentialism has led economists 
to evaluate different states of the world based exclusively on their pecuniary outcomes. Non-
pecuniary effects such as the fairness of the outcome, or distributive fairness, and the means by 
which different states are attained are typically ignored in the individual welfare maximization 
exercise. The failure to incorporate these non-pecuniary effects into economic models has 
amounted to poor predictions in some of them; a  classic example is the ultimatum game. 
Inaccurate predictions from this game and similar ones have driven researchers to incorporate 
concerns for distributive fairness into economic models. While there is now a general consensus 
that concerns for distributive fairness have a non-negligible impact on outcomes, the role that 
process plays in determining outcomes remain ambiguous.  
One aspect of process which appears to have a profound impact on decision is voice: the 
act of expressing one’s opinions. Some studies found that people perceive the process as fairer 
when voice is allowed even when the outcome is unfavourable to them (Lind et al., 1980; Van 
den Bos, 1999). The perceived fairness of the process is known in the psychological literature as 
procedural fairness. This positive association between voice and procedural fairness has been 
established in various social contexts, such as participatory decision-making (Greenberg and 
Folger, 1983) and performance appraisal and compensation plans (Greenberg, 1990; Miceli and 
Lane, 1991). Further, the opportunity for voice often increases the acceptance of decisions made 
by authorities even if the outcome is unfavourable (Vidmar, 1992; Lind et al., 1993; Peterson, 
1999).  These findings echo a long tradition in social theory—spanning from Jean Jacque 
Rousseau’s general will to Jurgen Habermas’s theory of depoliticization—  that voice has a 
strong influence on social decisions.
1
Drawing on a typology of procedural fairness as characterized by Dolan et al. (2007), we 
postulate that an individual values voice because 1) voice helps achieve fairer or more efficient 
outcomes, a consequentialist interpretation; 2) voice has inherent value in its own right and 3) 
adherence to an individual’s voice reflects that individual’s social standing since it implies that 
 However, there are few studies which explicitly test the 
mechanisms of voice apart from attributing the value of voice to procedural fairness and little is 
known about the channels in which voice affects the likelihood that one will accept an outcome.  
                                                 
1 See Jurgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" in Towards a Rational Society (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1970), pp. 81-122. his or her views are worth hearing  (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). While it is technically difficult 
to distinguish each of these effects and to test for their existence separately, we propose a 
variation of the ultimatum game which allows us to test for the relative influence of these three 
mechanisms of voice on decisions.  
A standard ultimatum game involves the division of an allotted sum of money between an 
offerer and a recipient. The offerer offers a portion of the allotted sum to the recipient who 
accepts or rejects the offer. If the recipient accepts, the two players distribute the allotted sum 
according to the offerer’s proposed distribution. If the recipient rejects, none of the players win 
the money. To test the three effects of voice, we propose a variant of the ultimatum game in 
which we randomly allow some of the recipients to have voice while explicitly and implicitly 
denying others the opportunity, similar to the experimental designs used by Folger (1977) and 
van des Bos (1999). Recipients who were explicitly denied the chance to voice their opinions 
were told that some recipients were randomly selected to voice their opinions but they were not 
chosen. Implicit denial of voice coincides with the standard ultimatum game since recipients 
were not informed that some recipients were randomly selected to voice their opinions but they 
were not chosen. The recipients in the voice group, on the other hand,  will be given the 
opportunity of one-way communication with the offerers, expressing their preferred distribution 
of the allotted sum of money and providing a justification on why their views should be adopted. 
This information will then be conveyed to the offerers, who will then decide whether to propose 
an offer which the recipient desires.  
The novelty of our ultimatum game lies in the introduction of a hypothetical round before 
real offers were made to  elicit  recipients’ responses to low unfair offers.  The offers in the 
hypothetical round, referred to as the hypothetical offers, were deliberately set at values that 
were likely to be lower than what recipients with voice were likely to propose so that we could 
observe their reactions their opinions about the division were ignored. Further, to ensure that the 
recipients respond to the offers made in the hypothetical round (hypothetical offers) in the same 
way as they would have responded to the offers made by the real offerers, the recipients were 
told that they would not be able to change their acceptance or rejection decisions if the real offers 
were equal to the hypothetical offers. Comparing the rejection rates in the hypothetical round 
across the voice group, the explicit no-voice group and the normal group, we are then able to 
deduce which of the three effects of voice that we outlined is the dominant effect.    We map the different notions of voice into our experimental design as follows. First, if 
individuals value voice only because it gives them better outcomes (a consequentialist position), 
the individuals with voice are equally likely to reject unfair low offers  as those without voice 
since only the outcome matters. Second, if the inherent value of voice is dominant, individuals 
with voice are less likely to reject unfair low offers than those without voice. Finally, if voice is 
primarily an embodiment of one’s standing, individuals with voice will be more likely to reject 
unfair low offers (below what they proposed) than those without voice when their opinions are 
not adopted. Using regression analysis, we can distinguish which of the three channels is the 
dominant channel through which voice predominantly affects the likelihood that one will accept 
an unfair outcome. 
In addition, we asked the recipients to rate the fairness of procedures before the actual 
offers were made. The procedural fairness ratings allow us to conduct three tests. First, we test 
whether a higher rating of procedural fairness increases the likelihood that one will accept an 
unfair outcome. Second, we test the hypothesis that promoting procedural fairness is one of the 
attributes, if not the main attribute of voice by which voice influences the decision to accept an 
unfair outcome. Third, we test whether the possibility of voice for some promotes procedural 
fairness of the game and, in turn, influences one’s decision to accept an unfair outcome. Since in 
most real life circumstances not everyone will have an opportunity to voice their opinions, the 
findings about the explicit no-voice group have  important implications about whether the 
possibility of voice for some is sufficient to increase the probability of offer acceptance and 
whether it improves the perception of the fairness of a situation.  
The next section describes the simple economic model underlying our hypotheses. 
Section three explains the details of the experiment. The findings of the experiment are then 
provided in the fourth section followed by the conclusion.  
 
2.  The Economic Model 
 
In standard game theoretic model of the ultimatum game, the recipient will accept any 
positive offer, 𝑖, as long as 𝑖 > 0 since only pecuniary payoffs matter to the recipient. However, 
experimental evidence from ultimatum games has  repeatedly contradicted the predictions of 
game theoretic models: recipients are likely to reject low offers and sometimes very high offers 
as well. Meyer (1992) restricted the offers to 20% and 30% and found that rejection rates are 68% and 39% respectively for a total sample size of 62. Sanfrey et al. (2003) repeated the ultimatum 
game ten times to 19 recipients who were told that they were playing the game with different 
partners for each game. They found that the rejection rates of offers that were 10%, 20% and 30% 
of the allotted sum were approximately 60%, 50% and 10%. Further, offerers were often found 
to offer half of the allotted amount (Kahneman et al., 1986; Thaler, 1988; Roth et al., 1995; 
Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, 1996; List and Cherry, 2000), which recipients will always accept. 
These results suggest that individuals have notions of equitable distributions and individuals do 
care about distributive fairness. 
There have been several studies which attempt to extend the classic game theoretic model 
of ultimatum game to better predict fit these findings. In particular, Rabin (1993) attributed the 
rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game to negative reciprocity – one’s act of harming 
people who treated them unfairly, even if substantial cost is involved; Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), on the other hand, explained the phenomenon by difference 
aversion models; while Charness and Rabin (2001) incorporated features of difference aversion, 
social welfare and reciprocity models in their model and found that social welfare and reciprocity 
are the main motivations to one’s decision to accept the offer.  
     We draw from the features of these models and outline a simple conceptual model to 
capture the preference of a recipient in a two-person ultimatum game when voice is allowed. 
Since we do not intend to explore the full interactions between the offerer and the recipient or the 
equilibrium outcome of the game, we focus on the utility function of the recipient of the offer. 
   Unlike the reciprocity models where the offerer’s payoff has a direct impact on the 
recipient’s utility, we assume that the decision to accept or reject an offer is solely self-interested. 
The recipient’s utility is affected by his or her payoff if he or she accepts the offer, the degree of 
distributive fairness associated with the offer received and whether he or she has the opportunity 
to voice his or her opinions. The recipient’s utility function is specified as: 
 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑖,𝑓 𝑑,𝑣) 
 
where i refers to the offer made to the recipient in the ultimatum game and 𝑓 𝑑 and 𝑣 represent the 
importance of distributive (or outcome) fairness and voice respectively to the recipient’s well-
being. Since distributive fairness depends on the offers made to the recipients, we have:  
𝑓 𝑑 = 𝑓 𝑑(𝑖,𝑖∗) 
 
where distributive fairness can be viewed as a symmetric inverted u-shaped function which 
depends on the gap between the proposed offer and the objectively equitable offer which is 
denoted by 𝑖∗.  Distributive or outcome fairness decreases the further one is from the objectively 
fair offer.   
If distributive fairness is accounted for and 𝑈(∙) is a monotonic increasing function of 𝑓 𝑑, 
𝑈(∙) inherits the inverted u-shaped property of 𝑓 𝑑. The utility function can then be characterized 
such that for offers lower than the critical value, 𝖤̂, the utility derived from accepting the offer is 
negative, and thus the recipient rejects all offers below 𝖤̂ , with the normalization that utility is 
equal to zero if the offer is rejected
2
  How does voice enter the utility function and in what form?  We formulate three possible 
types of utility functions based on three potential roles that voice may play.  
. The existence of 𝖤̂ in turn depends on the concavity of 𝑓 𝑑 
and ultimately 𝑈(∙). Therefore, a recipient may reject an unfair offer purely out of concern for 
distributive fairness.   
 
Model 1: If voice is only valuable because it provides utility-improving outcomes (the 
consequentialist view), then 𝑣 does not enter the utility function directly and so the recipient’s 
utility function is given by 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑖,𝑓 𝑑).  
 
Consider the additively separable utility function for the recipient j involved in a two-player 
game: 
                   𝑼??�????� = 𝜽????−𝜶�???? − ??∗�
𝛐                                                          (1) 
where 𝑖𝑗  refers to the offer made to the recipient. The first tem is the value of the pecuniary 
payoff and the second term represents preferences for distributive fairness. A simple application 
                                                 
2 Since the utility function is inverted u-shaped, it is possible that recipients will also reject offers above a second 
critical offer,  𝖤̂ℎ. However, as our experiment focuses on unfair low offers made to the recipients, we will not 
discuss unfair high offers above a second critical offer,  𝖤̂ℎ. of the equity theory will posit 𝑖∗ to take the form  
𝑖𝑗+𝑖𝑘
2 , where 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗2F
3. The relative weight that the 
recipient places on pecuniary payoff as compared to distributive fairness is given by 𝗼/𝜃, where 
𝗼/𝜃 = ∞  refers to strict preference for distributive fairness and 𝗼/𝜃 = 0  refers to strict 
preference for material well-being
4
 
. Voice does not enter the utility function explicitly but it may 
influence the offers made by the offerers.  
Model 2: If voice has an inherent value of its own, the recipients’ utility function is given by 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑖,𝑓 𝑑,𝑣) where 𝑣 can be treated as an independent argument of the utility function. In this 
case, 𝑈(∙) is strictly increasing in 𝑣. Moreover, 𝑣 does not depend on 𝑖.  
 
Extending equation (1) we can specify Model 2 as:  
          𝑼??�????� = 𝜽????−𝜶�???? − ??∗�
𝛐
+ ??                                                   (2) 
 
where 𝑣 is a parameter representing the utility one derives from voicing his or her opinion. For 
instance, voice may affect one’s utility through improving perceptions of procedural fairness or 
voice may generate value simply by allowing individuals to state their case. Insofar as these 
effects of voice exist regardless of whether one’s opinions are adopted, voice has an 
unambiguous positive impact on one’s utility.  
  
Model 3: If voice promotes feelings of self-worth and one’s social standing, the recipients’ 
utility function is given by 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑖,𝑓 𝑑,𝑣) where 𝑈(∙) is monotonic increasing in 𝑣. Standing 
refers to the status within a group, which in our case is the experimental group that is randomly 
assigned. Unlike the dictator game where the outcome of the game is solely decided by the offer, 
the outcome of an ultimatum game is determined jointly by both the offerer and the recipient. 
Therefore, the player’s standing becomes relevant in this context. When respect is shown for 
                                                 
3 This specification of the utility function is similar to a specification by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). However, 
while we use the second term to represent concern for distributive fairness, Bolton and Ockenfels used the term to 
demonstrate individuals’ difference aversion.    
4 Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) had specified the same model with a similar interpretation. In their paper,  α = 1 
represents strict narrow self-interest while 𝗼 = 0 represents strict relativism, that is, players care only about relative 
payoffs. The distributively fair division is referred to as the social reference point. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) allow 
asymmetric effects of advantageous unfair outcomes and disadvantageous unfair outcomes. one’s opinions, feelings of positive standing are enhanced (Tyler and Bies, 1990) and thus utility 
increases. Expressing respect in terms of voice, we have as 𝑣 = 𝑣(𝑖,𝖤̅) where 𝖤̅ represents the 
offer which the recipient had voiced to the offerer
5
 
. The recipient’s standing is determined by the 
perception of the extent to which the offerer considered his or her views. Lower offers than 𝖤̅ 
reflect deliberate neglect of the recipient’s standing and thus decrease the recipient’s utility. As 
such 𝑣  is a strictly increasing function of 𝑖 for 𝑖 < 𝖤̅. In principle, individuals can perceive higher 
offers as furthering respect or standing. Thus 𝑣 may be increasing for all 𝑖. 
Model 3 can be specified as:  
               𝑼??�????� = 𝜽????−𝜶�???? − ??∗�
𝛐
− 𝜷�???? � − ????�                        (3) 
 
It can be shown for all 𝖤𝖥 �, the threshold value of offer, 𝖤̂, lower than which the offer will be 
rejected, is decreasing in 𝗽. Therefore, if voice embodies one’s standing, a recipient with voice 
will be less likely to accept a low offer than a recipient without voice.  
  Figure  1  illustrates  the differences in the utility functions of the three models
6
In Figure 1, we assume a relative importance of income compared to distributive fairness 
(𝗼 < 𝜃), so that recipients have the highest utility when offer is more than 5 dollars. With our 
normalization of the utility of rejecting an offer as zero, recipients will accept an offer if the 
resulting utility is greater or equal to zero. Therefore, in this example, recipients will always 
accept offers greater than 5 dollars even though the offer is distributively unfair to the offerer. 
. The 
allotted sum to be shared between the offerer and the recipient is 10 dollars. The M1 curve 
denotes the utility function which coincides with Model 1 –  the outcome-oriented or 
consequentialist interpretation of voice. The M2 curve denotes the utility function which 
coincides with Model 2, where voice has an inherent value in itself, which is treated as a constant 
parameter in the plot. The M3 curve describes the utility functions where voice is valued for 
respect or standing and standing decreases in disadvantageous unfair offers 𝑖.  
                                                 
5 We assume that 𝖤̅ is exogenously determined so that we do not derive 𝖤̅ in terms of a strategy that is determined in 
the game theoretic sense. It should also be noted that 𝖤̅ reflects the recipient’s perception of his or her self worth in 
the game which may not be equivalent to 
* i , the objectively fair offer.  
6 The parameter values used are: 𝜃 = 1, 𝗼 = 0.4  𝑣 = 2,𝗽 = 0.85 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖∗ = 𝖤̅ = 5. However, the recipient may not enjoy the highest utility even when the offer is equivalent to the 
entire allotted sum as he or she cares about distributive fairness.    
We can interpret the plots in Figure 1 by first imagining that a recipient in a standard 
ultimatum game has a utility function similar to M1 curve. This recipient will always accept an 
offer above or equal to approximately 2.5 dollars and reject otherwise. Suppose that this recipient 
is allowed voice. If voice has an impact as predicted by Model 1, the utility function of this 
recipient remains as M1 curve. In other words, this recipient values voice only for its effects on 
outcomes, including preferences for fairness. Relative to this case, we have the two other 
channels for voice.  If voice has an inherent value of its own, the utility function of this recipient 
is shifted upwards by a constant parameter so that his utility is now represented by M2 curve. In 
this example, the inherent value of voice is sufficient such that when voice is allowed, this 
recipient is willing to accept a low offer of 2 dollars and reject otherwise. In other words, a 
recipient with M2-type utility function is less likely to reject a low offer as compared to a 
recipient with M1-type utility function when voice is allowed
7
Figure 1
. On the other hand, if voice 
reflects one’s standing and 𝑣 is a strictly increasing function in offers, the utility function of this 
recipient changes from M1 to M3 when voice is allowed. From  , the recipient will reject 
an offer of 2 dollars as well as an offer of 3 dollars. Therefore, we can posit that a recipient with 
M3-type utility function is more likely to reject a low offer as compared to a recipient with M1-




          [Figure 1] 
 




                                                 
7 By “less likely”, we mean that the range of offers which the recipient will reject is smaller if he has M2-type utility 
function than the range of offers of a recipient who has M1-type utility function. Due to heterogeneity in utility 
functions however, even with smaller rejection ranges, some recipients may still reject a low offer.   
8 Theoretically, it is possible that voice has both inherent value in itself and embodies one’s standing at the same 
time. Therefore, the ultimatum game only allows us to deduce which is the dominant effect between the two and not 
whether one exists while the other does not.      An invitation email was sent to all first and second year undergraduates in Nanyang 
Technological University, Singapore, notifying them of the experiment. Participation in the 
experiment was voluntary. Students received SGD $2 for participating in the experiment, in 
addition to their payoffs, if any, from the experiment. A total of 150 students completed the 
experiment. The summary statistics of the participating students are presented in Table 1. 53% of 
participants were male. Students from different course majors participated in the experiment, 41% 
of which majored in engineering or natural sciences, 24% majored in social sciences, 12% 
majored in humanities and 23% majored in business or accountancy. . It is noteworthy that 
Economics majors only accounted for 2% of the sample. This is important since Economics 
majors were more likely than students of other majors to have heard of the ultimatum game 
experiment and therefore may be prone to react in the way standard economic theory predicts (to 
accept all positive offers).  
Participants were randomly assigned the roles of recipients and offerers. Of those 
assigned the roles of recipients, they were further randomly assigned to one of six cells: 3 types 
of voice conditions (voice, explicit no-voice, normal) with 2 types of offers (hypothetical offer of 
$2, hypothetical offer of $3). The offerers were randomly assigned to either the voice group or 
the others group.     
 
3.2 Experimental Procedure 
 
Participants were gathered at a computer lab for the experiment. The participants were 
informed that there would be strict anonymity for this experiment and they were identified for 
payment only through an identification number that was randomly generated by the computer 
program. The experiment was administered through an interactive computer program.  
The ultimatum game experiment involves a division of $10 (Singapore) between an 
offerer and a recipient. At its core, it involves the offerer making a proposal to the recipient on 
how the $10 should be allocated between them. After the offer is made, the recipient has to 
decide whether to accept or reject the offer. If the recipient rejects the offer, both the offerer and 
the recipient will receive only the token of appreciation for participating in the experiment. If the 
recipient accepts the offer, the offerer and the recipient will receive the $10 according to the 
agreed division in addition to the token of appreciation.   To test how voice affects the recipients’ decision to accept the offer, we devise three 
separate scenarios for the participants playing the role of the recipients, henceforth referred to as 
voice, explicit no-voice and normal scenarios, following van de Bos’ (1999) terminology. In the 
voice scenario, recipients were allowed to communicate to the offerers what they thought should 
be the division and their reason why (through the computer program) before the offerers make a 
proposed division. This group of recipients will be referred to as the voice group. In the explicit 
no-voice scenario, recipients were told that some of the participants of the experiments were 
randomly selected to convey to the offerers their opinions and the reasons for their desired 
division, but they were not selected. This group of recipients will be referred to as the explicit 
no-voice group. Recipients in the normal group play the standard ultimatum game where 
participants were not informed that a voice option was available to some of the other participants.  
The explicit no-voice group serves as complementary test to the voice group. It allows us 
to test if the possibility to voice one’s opinion (when one is not chosen to do so) has the same 
effect as the actual opportunity to voice one’s opinion, in terms of the effect on offer acceptance 
and perceptions of procedural fairness. If the possibility for voice is no different from the actual 
opportunity to voice, procedural fairness ratings of the voice and the explicit no-voice group will 
be identical. The probability of accepting the unfair offer will also be identical for the two groups. 
Alternatively, the possibility of voice may affect the recipients differently as compared to the 
actual opportunity to voice. If a recipient knew she was not chosen to voice, her disappointment 
may lead her to view the procedure as more unfair than if everyone had the opportunity to voice 
or even if everyone had no opportunity to voice.  Procedural fairness ratings would then be lower 
in the explicit no-voice group than the voice group and even the normal group, which may in 
turn affect the probability of offer acceptance. Apart from its effect on procedural fairness, the 
presence of an explicit no-voice group also allows us to test whether the possibility of voice has 
inherent value in itself that will increase the likelihood that one will accept a low offer. 
There were two possible sets of instructions for the offerers. The only distinction between 
these two sets of instructions was that offerers who were matched with the voice group were 
instructed to view the opinions of the voice group before proposing an offer. The offerers 
matched to the implicit and explicit no-voice groups simply proposed an offer
9
                                                 
9 The full instructions are provided on request. 
. The rules of the ultimatum game were explained to the participants with variations depending on the role and 
scenario they to which they were assigned.  
After the recipients were presented the instructions to the experiment, the recipients in the 
voice group provided their opinions on their desired division, including their reason for the 
division. All three groups of recipients were then told to first complete a hypothetical round 
before they were entered into a random draw which would determine if they were to be matched 
to an offerer.  To elicit respondents’ reactions to the hypothetical offers as though they were real 
offers, respondents were told that their responses in the hypothetical round would be 
automatically evoked if the offerer made the same offer as the hypothetical offer. In other words, 
the recipient were told that they would not have a second chance to revise his or her acceptance 
decision should the offerer propose the same division as was provided in the hypothetical round. 
Finally, after the hypothetical round, the recipients were asked to rate the procedural fairness of 
the experiment.  
The hypothetical round is a novel feature which we introduced into the standard 
ultimatum game to facilitate the testing of all three models, particularly Model 3. Recall that 
Model 3 states that voice essentially represents one’s standing. When one’s views are ignored, 
his or her standing is undermined and therefore he or she is more likely to reject a low offer. In 
most ultimatum games involving two players, the offerers are found to offer 50% of the allotted 
sum most of the time. As such, the probability that a recipient’s opinion would be disregarded is 
likely to be extremely small. Coupled with the difficulty in obtaining a large sample size in an 
experimental setup, this makes it almost impossible to conduct a statistical analysis to test the 
appropriateness of Model 3 and distinguish between the models. Therefore, to test Model 3, we 
need to ensure that the offers made to the recipients in the voice group are always less than what 
they suggested to the offerers. At the same time, the offers made to the recipients cannot be too 
high or too low such that recipients will almost always accept or reject the offer. Since it is 
unlikely that the standard ultimatum game will be able to satisfy all these conditions, we 
introduced a hypothetical round where recipients were asked to respond to hypothetical offers. 
The hypothetical offers were fixed at either 20% or 30% of the allotted sum, the levels which are 
documented to have non-negligible rejection rates as well as non-zero acceptance rates. The non-
negligible rejection rates suggest that the minimum acceptable offers for most respondents are in the range of 20% to 30%. This serves as assurance that most recipients will suggest offers higher 
than 20% or 30% of the allotted sum to the offerers.  
In the hypothetical round, the recipients were randomly offered either $2 or $3 and asked 
if they would accept this hypothetical offer. To provide a sufficient incentive for the recipients to 
deliberate the hypothetical offers, the participants were informed at the start of the game that 
there was a twenty percent chance that they would be randomly selected for a matched game. 
The participants were told whether they were selected for the matched game only after they had 
completed the hypothetical round. For the participants who were not selected for the matched 
game, the experiment was terminated after the hypothetical round. Without this experimental 
design, it would not have been possible to test for the three possible voice effects with even our 
large number of subjects.   
It should be noted that while the experiment is customised to allow us to test Model 3, the 
introduction of the hypothetical round and having the hypothetical offers in the stated range do 
not hinder the tests for Model 1 or Model 2. This is because the magnitudes of the hypothetical 
offers are only consequential in the context of Model 3, but not in the other two models, since the 
impact of voice is universal for the entire set of offers in the latter. Restating the hypotheses, 
Model 3 predicts that recipients in the voice group are more likely to reject the hypothetical 
offers as compared to the recipients in the normal group because the recipients’ views were 
ignored; Model 2 predicts that recipients in the voice group are less likely to reject the 
hypothetical offers as compared to the recipients in the normal group since voice increases utility 
for all levels of offers; Model 1 predicts that recipients in the voice group are just as likely to 
reject the hypothetical offers relative to the recipients in the normal group, as voice is only an 
instrument that may improve the offer that is made and its success or failure in doing so does not 
affect the recipient’s utility. 
Since the acceptance decisions in the hypothetical round are sufficient for our analysis, 
theoretically, no real offerers are required. However, the existence of offerers is imperative in 
eliciting the true responses of the recipients in the hypothetical round and to insure that the 
subjects were being treated honestly by the experimenters.  
  
 
 4.  Results 
 
Recall that in the hypothetical rounds, we assigned low values of “$2” or “$3” for offers 
as we anticipated that recipients offered the opportunity to suggest their preferred offers would 
likely suggest ones higher than the hypothetical offers. Indeed, except for only two of the 
recipients in the voice group, all other participants proposed offers higher than the hypothetical 
offer which they eventually received. Those two recipients were eliminated from our subsequent 
analysis to facilitate our testing of Model 3. The total sample size used in the following analyses 
is 148. Of the remaining recipients in the voice group, 71.7% proposed equal divisions to the 
offerers, citing fairness or equity as the reason for their proposal. This suggests that an equal 
share of $5 for each player may be what most recipients think of as distributively fair.  
We analyze the effects of voice by comparing the difference in acceptance rates between 
the voice group and the normal group. These differences must be attributed to either to the 
inherent value of voice or the value of voice in promoting one’s standing in the game. If the 
inherent value of voice is dominant, individuals with voice would be more likely to accept unfair 
low offers than the recipients in the normal group. If voice is primarily an embodiment of one’s 
standing, the recipients with voice would be less likely to accept unfair low offers than those 
without since the hypothetical offers were strictly lower than their proposed divisions.  
Table 2 reports the recipients’ acceptance rates for the low offers. The overall acceptance 
rates for a hypothetical offer (either $2 or $3) for voice group, explicit no-voice group and the 
normal group are 50%, 47% and 36% respectively. Despite the differences in percentages, taken 
collectively, there is no statistically significant difference in the raw acceptance rates across the 
three groups (𝜒2(2) =2.273, p<0.321). Comparing the voice group and the normal group, there is 
a 14% difference in the acceptance rate (𝜒2(1) =2.019, p<0.155) while a 11% difference in the 




  Apart from the raw offer acceptance rates, we compare the procedural fairness ratings 
across the three groups in Table 3. As expected, a higher proportion of recipients in the voice 
group rated the procedure of the game to be at least “somewhat fair” than in the other two groups (52.17% in the voice group compared to 34.69% in the explicit no-voice group and 43.4% in the 
normal group, 𝜒2(2) =2.955, p<0.228).  Comparing the voice group and the explicit no-voice 
group only, recipients who knew they were not selected to voice their opinions have significantly 
lower procedural fairness ratings than recipients who had the opportunity to voice 
(𝜒2(1) =2.955, p<0.086).  Comparing the explicit no-voice group and normal group,  recipients 
who knew they were not selected to voice their opinions do not have higher procedural fairness 
ratings than recipients who did not know they were not selected to voice their opinions 
(𝜒2(2) =0.761, p<0.383).  Therefore, the results seem to suggest that the procedure is perceived 
to be fairer when all participants in the experiment go through the same procedure. Another 
interesting phenomenon that is observed in Table 3 is that although the proportion of recipients 
who rated the game to be very unfair was the highest in the explicit no-voice group, this group 




Table 4 displays the results of a probit regression for offer acceptance. Regression I tests 
whether the opportunity for voice (the voice group) or the possibility of voice (the explicit no-
voice group) has effects on the offer acceptance rates, controlling for the effect on procedural 
fairness, while regression II tests the hypothesis that procedural fairness alone is sufficient to 
explain offer acceptance rates. Regression I, which is the preferred model, shows that a recipient 
in the voice group is significantly more likely to accept an unfair offer than the control group, 
even though her opinion on the division is not adopted. This result coincides with the prediction 
of Model 2 which states that voice has an inherent value of its own.  Moreover, since the 
coefficient of the voice dummy remains significant after controlling for the recipients’ ratings of 
procedural fairness, the inherent value of voice exceeds its effect on procedural fairness.  
One possible explanation for this key result is that the recipients value the ability to state 
their case, irrespective of the impact that their opinions will have on the outcome or their general 
sense of fairness about the procedures.  Tyler et al. (1985) described this as the ‘value-expressive’ 
aspect of voice. In regression I, the coefficient of the dummy representing the no-voice group is 
positive, although not significant. This suggests that the possibility of voice is insufficient to 
increase the probability that one would accept an unfair offer. The voice and explicit no-voice dummies are excluded from regression II to test if the perception of procedural fairness alone is 
sufficient to influence the probability of offer acceptance. The results show that the perception of 
procedural fairness has a positive but not significant impact on the probability of offer 
acceptance. This implies that the perception of the fairness of the procedures may increase the 
probability that one will accept an unfair offer only marginally if at all. 
 In both regressions, the coefficient of the dummy representing the hypothetical of $2 is 
negative, which is the correct sign despite being statistically insignificant. In terms of recipients’ 
characteristics, the results show that male recipients are less likely to accept an unfair offer than 
female recipients, suggesting that males may care more about fairness than females. This finding 
was also documented in Eckel and Grossman (2001) where women respondents were found to be 
more likely to accept a given offer in an ultimatum game regardless of the gender of the offerer.  
Apart from gender, we also included the majors of the recipients in regression (2) in Table 4. 
There are some differences in the acceptance behaviour between recipients of different majors. 
In particular, recipients who major in business or accountancy are significantly less likely to 




Recall that the explicit no-voice group has the highest proportion of recipients rating the 
procedures to be “very unfair” as well as the highest proportion of recipients rating the 
procedures to be “very fair”. Coupled with the substantial proportion of recipients who rated the 
procedure to be at least “somewhat fair”, it seems likely that for some recipients in the explicit 
no-voice group, the possibility of voice improved their perception of procedural fairness relative 
to when voice is disallowed. Thus we conducted an additional regression on recipients from the 
explicit no-voice group and the normal group, excluding the voice group. We included  an 
interaction term between the dummy variable for being a member of the explicit no-voice group 
and the procedural fairness ratings to test if recipients with different evaluations of procedural 
fairness in the explicit no-voice group have different probability of offer acceptance.  If the 
possibility of voice improves the perception of procedural fairness for some recipients in the 
explicit no-voice group and in turn makes those recipients more likely to accept the hypothetical 
offers, the coefficient of the interaction term will be positive and significant.  The results are presented in Table 5. Similar to the results in Table 4, the coefficient of 
procedural fairness rating is not statistically significant. The coefficient of the dummy which 
represents the explicit no-voice group in regression IV is also not statistically significant. This 
implies that the possibility of voice has little or no inherent value of its own. The coefficient of 
the interaction term of these two variables, however, is significant and positive in the regression 
IV. A simple calculation shows that only when a recipient in a no-voice group has a procedural 
fairness rating of more than 5.65 will he or she be more likely to accept an unfair offer than a 
recipient in the control group. This result provides preliminary evidence that when an individual 
is not selected to voice his or her opinion, the perception of the fairness of the procedure of the 
game may then become critical in determining whether he or she is willing to accept an unfair 




5.  Conclusion  
 
In this study, we developed a simple model that illustrated the channels through which 
voice could affect utility. We then applied the model using a novel variation of the classic 
ultimatum game.  The simplicity of the ultimatum game provides an excellent context to test the 
impact of voice as it involves real decisions to be made about whether to accept or reject an 
unfair outcome. We maximized the power of our experiment by introducing an experimental 
design with an initial hypothetical round of offers structured so that recipients were led to reveal 
their true attitudes towards the unfair offers in the initial round. Following our theoretical model, 
we explored three possible impacts of the opportunity to voice on one’s utility: the outcome or 
consequentialist value of voice, the inherent value of voice, and the role of voice in providing 
standing.  
After controlling for the effect of procedural fairness, recipients who had the opportunity 
to voice their views about the division to the offerers were significantly more likely to accept the 
unfair offers as compared to the recipients in a normal ultimatum game, even when  their 
opinions were ignored. Recipients who are not chosen for the version of the voice group but 
were aware of the opportunity that some others had to express voice were also more likely to 
accept the unfair offers as compared to the recipients in a normal ultimatum game, although this result is not significant. The improvement in acceptance rates of unfair offers in the voice group 
provides evidence that the effect of voice lies is its inherent value and not its role in providing 
social standing or improving outcomes. Further, the inherent value of voice appears to exceed its 
contribution to the perception of procedural fairness since the opportunity to voice did not 
significantly improve individuals’ perception of procedural fairness and procedural fairness did 
not appear have a significant influence on the recipients’ decision to accept an unfair offer. 
Further experimental investigations would be useful to pinpoint the values that voice embodies.  
  The results from the explicit no-voice group also reveal that in aggregate, the possibility 
of voice does not improve the individuals’ perception procedural fairness compared to when 
voice is not allowed at all. However, individuals who perceive the procedures to be fairer 
because of the possibility of voice are more likely to accept an unfair offer than those who 
perceive the procedures to be less fair. This suggests that while voice may soften the impact of 
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Figure 1 Utility Functions of The Three Models 
 
 

















Table 1 Summary Statistics of Participants’ Characteristics 
Characteristics  Percentage 
Male  52.7 
Course Major   
Engineering and Sciences  41.2 
Social Sciences  23.7 
Business and Accountancy  23.0 






























 Table 2 Acceptance Rates of Unfair Offers for Voice, Explicit No-Voice and Normal 
Groups 
 
  Voice  Explicit No-Voice  Normal 
Offers  $2  $3  $2  $3  $2  $3 
Acceptance Rate  0.56  0.48  0.38  0.57  0.37  0.35 
Sample Size  25  23  26  23  30  23 
Combined 
Acceptance Rate 
0.50  0.47  .036 






























Very Unfair  2.17  8.16  3.38 
Unfair  15.22  18.37  19.59 
Slightly Unfair  30.43  38.78  33.78 
Slightly Fair  32.61  20.41  26.35 
Fair  19.57  10.2  14.19 





























 Table 4 Probit Regression of Acceptance of Hypothetical Offers of Either $2 or $3 by Voice, 
Explicit No-Voice and Normal Groups 
  Accept Hypothetical Offer 
 VARIABLES  (I)  (II) 
      
Offer of $2  -0.129  -0.132 
   (0.221)  (0.220) 
Voice  0.520*   
   (0.274)   
No Voice  0.303   
   (0.261)   
Procedural Fairness  0.00232  0.015 
   (0.096)  (0.095) 
Male  -0.158  -0.183 
   (0.240)  (0.238) 
Major     
Business/Accountancy  -0.699**  -0.577* 
   (0.318)  (0.300) 
Social Sciences  0.17  0.173 
   (0.300)  (0.298) 
Humanities  -0.175  -0.122 
   (0.366)  (0.363) 
Constant  -0.138  0.0636 
   (0.481)  (0.450) 
      
Observations  148  148 
Log-likelihood  -95.62  -97.55 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 










 Table 5 Probit Regression on the Acceptance of Offer by the Explicit No-Voice and the 
Normal Groups 
   Accept Offer 
VARIABLES  III  IV 
  
    Offer of $2  -0.256  -0.254 
 
(0.261)  (0.265) 
No-Voice  0.300  -0.922 
 
(0.262)  (0.774) 
Procedural Fairness  -0.0108  -0.211 
 
(0.112)  (0.166) 
No-Voice X Procedural Fairness    0.374* 
 
  (0.223) 
Male  -0.281  -0.289 
 
(0.285)  (0.284) 
Major     
Business/Accountancy  -0.663  -0.731* 
   (0.419)  (0.425) 
Social Sciences  -0.0393  -0.0598 
   (0.343)  (0.348) 
Humanities  -0.341  -0.345 
   (0.423)  (0.413) 
Constant  0.114  0.794 
   (0.526)  (0.665) 
      
Observations  102  102 
Log-likelihood  -65.82  -64.51 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 ** represents p < 0.05, * represents p < 0.1 
 
 
 
 
 